Kuhn, 2/7

Hi Everyone,

My apologies for the late post. If you get this in time, hopefully you can give the following sections an additional look. If not, I'll try to direct us.

I'm really fascinated by Kuhn's claim that theory selection happens by a process analogous to natural selection. He makes these claims in section XII (The Resolution of Scientific Resolutions) and at the very concluding remarks of the book (at the end of XIII, Progress through Revolutions). Let's explore these claims in more depth.

Additionally, as we conclude our talk on Kuhn, I'd like to hear more about the wider implications of his work. In considering these implications, I think it's important to keep in mind where we are on our course road map. As I see it, we've moved from a discussion of rhetoric (Aristotle and Campbell); to the historical consciousness's overt awareness of the knowledge divide--or gulf--between science and humanities (Snow); to a discussion of the ways in which science and progression thereof is not the rational "clockwork" that idealized pictures of science might imply, but rather is influenced by biases and rhetorics (Kuhn). It seems that we're aimed at a theorist who claims that rhetoric is a natural part of all reasoning, including scientific reasoning (Gross). In what way is Kuhn a logical progression from these earlier thinkers? In what ways has he influenced later, as well as current, debates? Has his work influenced scientific practice or rather, has it only sought to describe science, and why does this distinction matter?

Clearly, we've talked about some of these matters already, but I see these topics as a reasonable focus for our concluding remarks on Kuhn.

Cheers!

Michael